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• Study the effect of uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard investment game.
• Measures of trust and trustworthiness are robust to both uncertainty and ambiguity.
• Proportion of individuals who send zero is marginally higher (10% significance level) under ambiguity compared to the baseline.
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a b s t r a c t
We
 
introduce
 
uncertainty
 
and
 
ambiguity
 
in
 
the
 
standard
 
investment
 
game.
 
In
 
the
 
uncertainty
 
treatment,
 investors
 
are
 
informed
 
that
 
the
 
return
 
of
 
the
 
investment
 
is
 
drawn
 
from
 
a
 
publicly
 
known
 
distribution
 function.
 
In
 
the
 
ambiguity
 
treatment,
 
investors
 
are
 
not
 
informed
 
about
 
the
 
distribution
 
function. We find
that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to the introduction of these changes.1. Introduction
Most daily interactions involve elements of uncertainty or am-
biguity. For example, a visit to the doctor, the quality of education,
or the outcome of a business venture, are situations all charac-
terized by ambiguity.1 Ambiguity arises when the distribution of
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1 The distinction between risky and ambiguous outcomes (Keynes, 1921; Knight,
1921) was shown to be relevant by Ellsberg (1961). He found that, in violationreturns is not known. Under uncertainty, however, this distribu-
tion is precisely known.
In this paper we study how uncertainty and ambiguity impact
trust and trustworthiness in the investment game (Berg et al.,
1995). The general result from these games (see the meta survey
by Johnson and Mislin, 2011) is that on average trust towards
strangers is observed and receivers return the amount sent,
although the results may depend upon features such as the size
of the multiplier, culture, the development of institutions, etc.
However, little is known about the robustness of trust in situations
with information asymmetry.
of expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954),
individuals, in general, preferred lotteries associated with known rather than
unknown probabilities.1
Our experimental design modifies the standard trust game
to allow for two types of information asymmetry. In the first
variation, the uncertainty treatment, the return of the investment
is an equally likely draw from the distribution {2, 3, 4}. In the
second variation, i.e. the ambiguity treatment, the investor only
knows that the return of the investment is greater than one,
and has no other knowledge of the underlying distribution. The
information regarding the value of themultiplier in this case is thus
ambiguous.2
The introduction of information asymmetry does not change
the theoretical prediction based on rational and selfish subjects.
Even with information asymmetry, investees would return zero
and investors would anticipate this and send the same. This may,
however, not be the case if behavior is driven by a combination
of conditional (reciprocity) and unconditional other-regarding
preferences (such as unconditional altruismor inequality aversion;
see Cox, 2004). For the same level of investment, investees may
perceive a greater level of trust under information asymmetry than
under certainty and return a higher amount to investors. Similarly,
investors’ decisions could be affected by their belief about the
actual return of the investment (unknown under information
asymmetry, even if they know the distribution of returns). For
example, an altruistic investor may send a higher amount if the
personal cost is lower (i.e. higher return of investment). Given this,
we do not make explicit a priori conjectures about the effect of
information asymmetry on trust and trustworthiness.
We find that trust and trustworthiness are mostly robust to
the variations introduced to the standard investment game. The
number of individuals sending zero is larger under ambiguity, but
they are a very small number. However, the overall effect on trust
is not significant as the behavior of the majority of the subjects
who send a positive amount is not affected by the introduction of
information asymmetry.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
experimental design. In Section 3 we present the results, and
Section 4 concludes.
2. Experimental design
A total of 346 undergraduate students from Universidad
Carlos III were recruited for an hour. The average payoff was
approximately e12.34. Including the instructions, the experiment
lasted 45min. All subjectswere given a questionnaire prior to their
recruitment. Responding to the questionnaire was a pre-requisite
to participating in the experiments. The questionnaire contained
personal information about age, studies, grades, family origin etc.
Individuals were randomly selected into sessions and roles
were randomly assigned. Senders (investors) and receivers (in-
vestees) of the investment game were assigned to separate rooms
in the same building before they arrived for the experiment.
Senders and receivers were referred to as player A and player B, re-
spectively, and were told that they would be paired with another
person (A/B) in a different room.
The following details were common to all treatments. All
instructions3 were computer based. Participants were paid their
earnings privately. Both senders and receivers got a 100 dex4
endowment. The sender could send any amount (M) between 0
and 100 dex to the receiver. The amount received by the receiver
was multiplied by k. Upon receipt the receiver decided how
2 Note thatwe are not comparing uncertainty vs. ambiguity in the Ellsberg (1961)
framework.
3 Appendix B.
4 Experimental money.Table 1
Descriptive statistics. Trust.
Average (median)
[standard deviation]
Baseline Uncertainty
treatment
Ambiguity
treatment
Trust 0.462 0.438 0.375
(0.500) (0.300) (0.350)
[0.295] [0.344] [0.283]
N 61 55 57
much to send back to the sender. Below we outline the specific
characteristics of each treatment.
Baseline: Both senders and receivers were told that k took a value
of 3. All information was known by all players.
Uncertainty: The sender was told that k could take any value
between {2, 3, 4} with equal probability. The receiver knew the
actual value of k and was aware that the sender did not know its
true value. All this was common information.
Ambiguity: The senderwas told that k could take any value greater
than one, and that the receiver knew the actual value of k. All this
was common information for both players.5
3. Results
3.1. Trust
The standard measure of trust is the proportion of the en-
dowment that the investor (sender) sends to the trustee (re-
ceiver). In Table 1 we report the descriptive statistics of the mea-
sure of trust for our treatments. We find that trust is not sig-
nificantly affected by the introduction of information asymmetry
(Kruskal–Wallis, KW, p = 0.3238). Compared to the baseline, aver-
age trust does not change significantly under uncertainty (Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon, MWW, p = 0.5166) or ambiguity (MWW,
p = 0.1091). Also, we do not find significant differences between
uncertainty and ambiguity treatments (MWW, p = 0.5440).
We further confirm our results by running OLS regressions
in which we regress trust on the treatment dummy and several
controls, such as year of birth, gender, and dummies reflecting
whether the subjects are foreigners and first year students
(freshman). We also control for session dummies. Our results
(Table A1 in Appendix A) confirm that our measure of trust
is not significantly affected by the introduction of information
asymmetry. We also analyze the behavior of those who send zero
and, those who send a positive amount. Interestingly, we observe
that the proportion of individuals who send zero (Appendix A,
Table A1—column two) is marginally higher (10% significance
level) under ambiguity compared to the baseline. However,
restricting to those subjects who sent a positive amount we find
no treatment differences (Appendix A, Table A1—column three).
Given that the proportion of subjects sending zero is relatively
small (Baseline: 2 out of 61, 3.3%; Uncertainty: 5 out of 55, 9.1%;
Ambiguity: 8 out of 57, 14.0%), we do not find an overall effect on
trust as a majority of the subjects (who send a positive amount) do
not change their behavior significantly.
Result 1. Trust is unaffected by the introduction of uncertainty
and ambiguity. However, the introduction of ambiguity marginally
increases the probability that subjects send zero.
5 In this treatment the value of kwas always equal to 3.2
Table 2
Descriptive statistics. Trustworthiness.
Average (median)
[standard deviation]
Baseline Uncertainty
treatment
Ambiguity
treatment
Trustworthiness 0.190 0.185 0.199
(0.166) (0.073) (0.160)
[0.212] [0.225] [0.195]
N 59 50 49
3.2. Trustworthiness
In Table 2 we report the descriptive statistics for trustworthi-
ness. Trustworthiness is defined as the percentage returned by
the receiver (out of the amount received) to the sender. We find
that the average level of trustworthiness is not different across
treatments (Kruskal–Wallis, KW, p = 0.7681). Compared to the
baseline, average trustworthiness does not change significantly
under uncertainty (MWW, p = 0.7976) or ambiguity (MWW,
p = 0.5597). Also, we do not find significant differences between
uncertainty and ambiguity treatments (MWW, p = 0.5153).
A more detailed regression analysis (Table A2 in Appendix A)
also reveals no significant effect of uncertainty or ambiguity on
trustworthiness. Below we state Result 2.
Result 2. Trustworthiness is unaffected by the introduction of
uncertainty and ambiguity.4. Conclusion
We find that both trust and trustworthiness are robust to
the introduction of uncertainty and ambiguity in the standard
investment game. The probability of sending zero marginally
increases under ambiguity but the majority of subjects, who send
a positive amount, do not change their behavior significantly.
The fact that trustworthiness is unaffected suggests that receivers
are not sensitive to or do not pay attention to the amount of
information given to senders.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.019.
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